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1.

Background and Introduction

Software is either correct or incorrect in design to a specification, in contrast
with hardware, which is reliable to a certain level in performing to a correct
design. Certifying the correctness of such software requires two conditions,
namely:
1. Statistical testing with inputs characteristic of actual usage, and
2. No failures in the testing.
If any failures arise in testing or subsequent usage, the software is incorrect,

and the certification is invalid. If such failures are corrected, the certification
process can be restarted, with no use of previous testing results. Such corrections may or may not lead to additional failures. So, ·certifying the correctness of software is an empirical process that is bound to succeed if the
software is indeed correct and may appear to succeed for some time if the
software is incorrect.
Cleanroom Engineering introduces new levels of practical precision for
achieving correct software, using three engineering teams. First, one team
of specification engineers creates formal specifications and breaks them into
increments for development and certification. Next, another team of development engineers creates software to the specifications of these increments with
formal verification, but without testing or debugging. Finally, another team
of certification engineers tests and certifies the correctness of growing numbers of increments by stratified statistical testing. Any failures are returned
for fixing to the development engineers and for retesting by the certification
engineers for a new certification of correctness of the software. A new level
of human capability is required in specification engineering, development
engineering, and certification engineering, but it is a level that software
engineers find possible.
In order to carry out effective software testing and to achieve high reliability, one needs to start with well-specified and well-developed software.
Highly reliable performance cannot be tested into poorly developed
software. So we will be concerned with the entire software engineering process that culminates in the certification of well-specified and well-developed
software.
Software can be developed and certified as correct under statistical quality
control to well-formed specifications of user requirements. To be humanly
practical in sizable software systems, the specifications must be structured
and defined in construction increments that accumulate into the final systems. This ability requires a sound development methodology to create
software that is easily testable by engineering design and mathematical verification, in particular with no unit testing at all by the developers. Unit
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testing and fixing of informally developed code is the most error-prone
activity in software development today, leading to deeper failures in 15% or
more of the fixes.
This ability also requires a test methodology based not only on the function and performance specifications, but also on the usage specifications,
namely how critical each test case is to assessing the practical correctness of
system behavior. Such a test methodology must be based on a stratified
statistical strategy derived from the statistics of usage and the importance
of the usage expected for the software. For an important case, a stratus may
even consist of a single case (with probability 1), or may consist of a small
ubset of cases, on out to strata containing large sections of the software. A
test design defines each stratus (possibly hundreds or thousands) and the
number of tests in each one. Testing without any failures found leads to
certification of correctness of the software or software segment.
If failures are later found, the certification is negated. If failures are fixed,
the certification process can be started again. In any case, certification continues with software release to users, moving with confidence from a level of
some three sigma at release up to and beyond six sigma with sufficient usage
without failures.
Software is either correct or incorrect in design to a specification, in contrast with hardware that is reliable to a certain level in performing to a
correct design. For small and regular software, it may be possible to test
exhaustively the software to determine its correctness. But software of any
size or complexity can only be tested partially, and typically a very small
fraction of possible inputs are actually tested. While possibly frustrating at
first glance, this is all humans can assert about the correctness of software.
But on second glance, the sequential history of certification efforts provides
a human basis for assessing the quality of the software and some expectations
for achieving future correctness.

1.1

History in Statistical Quality Control

Computer software is little over a human generation old, and software
development as it is practiced today has been worked out in just that short
time. Think of accounting when it was just a human generation old, whenever and wherever that may have been. It certainly did not have double entry
bookkeeping, and not even sound arithmetic methods. Civil engineering did
not have right triangles or methods of calculating areas at that stage.
Software has many more people than accounting and civil engineering at
that time, but fundamental ideas still take time to develop, even though
people in the field are making do with what is available.
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In another direction, statistical quality control (SQC) came into being
about a human generation ago, with the work of Dr. Edward Deming and
others in manufacturing in the 1950s. However, American industry largely
ignored the new ideas of SQC in that period, getting along with however
they were dealing (or not dealing) with quality. Statistics seemed like odd
and extraneous effort in the industry, and hardly seemed worth doing in
manufacturing. Of course, the rest of the story is well known, with Dr.
Deming and others taking SQC to Japan with dramatic successes in Japanese
industry, creating products with entirely new levels of both quality and
productivity. By now American industry has largely caught up with Japanese
industry in manufacturing SQC, but it has taken quite a while.
It is now known how to develop software also by using statistical quality
control. IBM and the US DOD DARPA STARS Program have supported
this basis of SQC in software development. There is a considerable difference
in SQC between manufacturing and software. But manufactuing SQC has
been very informative and helpful in going to software.
In manufacturing, the design is considered correct and the SQC applies
to creating physical products to the design specifications. The design may
be wrong for the product, but the job of manufacturing is to meet the design,
right or wrong. The physical parts may be slightly incorrect but the product
must still meet the design on a physical basis. For example, a wire cannot
be cut to a 10 mm length exactly, but say within 0.001 mm, and still meet
specifications in the product performance.
Manufacturing under SQC is very different from that under previous
controls. For example, in a 1950 assembly line of 20 stations, each station
generating parts and adding to the product was producing products at a
rapid rate, but many such products might then be found to be defective in
the testing that followed. The attempted solution to such problems was to
improve the part-making stations, because if each station was producing
perfect parts the product would be satisfactory. But while some
improvements were indeed made, new products had similar problems no
matter how hard people tried.
Manufacturing under SQC used ideas that first seemed strange and of no
use. In the assembly line of 20 stations, first work out how each intermediate
assembly at each point should perform; in many cases the stations must be
redesigned to make this possible. Next; provide statistical measurements for
the performances of the intermediate assemblies at each station, and make
these measurements right there as each partial product comes down the line.
Now, shocking as it may seem, stop the entire assembly line if any partial
product fails its performance test. Fix the reason for the failure in whatever
preceding stations necessary. All the workers are idle now! What a dumb
thing that seems. In the old assembly line everybody worked hard all the
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time. But forcing all the parts to be right during assembly created a dramatic
improvement in both quality and productivity. The idle workers were a
clear motivation for getting the work stations accurate to levels previously
unimagined.
So, in retrospect, SQC seemed very strange for manufacturing assembly
lines in American industry. Who would think such ideas would be practical?
No wonder American industry turned it down in the 1950s. And the objective
is not statistics, it is quality control. The reason for statistics is that it is the
only way to achieve real quality control. The improvement in productivity
is a pleasant surprise, but it becomes understandable when the amount of
rework becomes known. It is now understood as unnecessary with better
parts work and good management.

1.2

Application of SOC to Software Development

With this background, it is time to apply SQC to software development.
However, it is the design that must be produced correctly to meet a software
specification. Just as in American manufacturing in the 1950s, American
software in the 1990s is created in well-intended ways without SQC. Its
performance is low in both quality and productivity compared with what is
possible. In a 1990 European conference in Oslo, a Japanese group stated
that Japanese companies were moving into SQC as described in this chapter.
But American companies need not bring up the rear this time around in
software. Just as in manufacturing SQC 40 years ago, it is not easy for
managers and workers of today to move into software SQC. Everyone is so
busy, how do they find time to learn the new ideas? It requires new capabilities, but capabilities present in educated and disciplined people. For example,
manufacturing workers discovered they could create parts that were orders
of magnitude more accurate than previously imagined, with increased productivity. Right now, well-intentioned and experienced programmers imagine that software must have a few failures- say one to five per thousand
lines of code- on release, and they cannot imagine a serious objective of
creating software with no failures and higher productivity. It is not right to
ask programmers to work faster, but to work smarter with real engineering
discipline under SQC.
Zero failure software is not possible with heuristic methods of programming used in this first human generation of software development. It is
possible with mathematics-based design discipline and statistics-based test
discipline as discussed in Mills (1986) . Despite the experiences of the first
human generation in software development, zero defect software is possible
with the use of formal methods of program design and verification. Correctness verification and statistical testing reinforce and complement each other
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in surprising ways in achieving zero defects. Design discipline is made possible by the work of Dijkstra, Parnas and Wang (1989), and others. Test
discipline is made possible by the work of Poore et al. (1990), Whittaker
(1992), and others. Such a design discipline was taught in a six-course curriculum in Software Engineering (Linger et al. , 1979 ; Mills et al. , 1986) across
IBM in the 1980s with a faculty of over 60 well-prepared teachers and over
10,000 students. SEI (Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon
University) can teach and help others teach good design discipline.
Software development has certainly improved in many ways over the past
40 years. It has become better managed, here and there, in dealing with
larger and more complex system development and software product problems. Basic technology has improved dramatically, with high-level languages,
structured programming, and modular design for uniprogramming. It has
not improved as dramatically for uniprogram testing or multi program design
or testing. But the most deficient activity in software development today
is the use of, and dependence on, private unit testing and debugging of
software.
It seems unbelievable from the outside that debugging software should be
so difficult. But such debugging with a fix for a discovered fault will lead to
a new fault at least 15% of the time (Adams, 1980). This number of new
faults resulting from fixes has been a major surprise. Many large software
systems or products cannot be successfully debugged because of such new
faults. For example, the first optimized PL/ I compiler, with more than 50
programmers for more than two years, was never released because it could
not be debugged. An airline passenger reservation system that involved even
more effort and time was never released and resulted in a major loss by the
developer. At the moment, there seems no other way to create software than
to code, unit test, and debug it the way it has always been done. But major
and minor software development failures continue, and there is another way
to create software, namely to outlaw private unit testing and debugging, as
discussed next.

2.

Cleanroom Engineering

As noted, two major properties of Cleanroom Engineering are:
1. No debugging by the developers before the software goes to independent testers, and
2. Statistical testing taking into account both the usage and the criticalness
of software parts.
As we discuss next, there are more properties, but these two both seem
critical or impossible at first glance compared with how software is developed
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today. They are both related to the short history of software of just a single
human generation. For example, it took a human generation to discover
touch typing for typewriters and it was not easy to make that happen. In
another direction, farming today is entirely different than it was a human
generation ago. It has become mechanized even more and moved from
small one-family farms to larger corporate farms. In a similar way, serious
software development will become a large-scale engineering operation rather
than an intuitive programming operation.
Cleanroom Engineering develops software of certified correctness under
statistical quality control in a pipeline of increments that accumulate into the
specified software product. In the cleanroom process no program debugging
is permitted before independent statistical usage testing of the increments as
they accumulate into the final product (Cobb and Mills, 1990 ; Dyer, 1992a) .
The Cleanroom process provides rigorous methods of software specification,
development, and certification, through which disciplined software engineering teams are capable of producing zero defect software of arbitrary size
and complexity (Whittaker and Poore, 1992). Such engineering discipline is
capable not only of producing correct software, but also of the certification
of the correctness of the software as specified.
Software is either correct or incorrect in design to a well-defined specification, in contrast to hardware which is reliable to a certain level in performing
to a design that is assumed to be correct. For small and regular software, it
may be possible to test exhaustively the software to determine its correctness.
Even then, failures from human fallibility can be overlooked. But software
of any size or complexity can only be tested partially, and typically only a
very small fraction of possible inputs can actually be tested. At first glance,
the fractions are so small for systems of ordinary size that the task of
testing looks impossible. But when combined with mathematical verification,
correct software is indeed possible.
For interactive software, the statistical correlation of successive inputs
must be treated as well. If any failures arise in testing or subsequent usage,
the software is incorrect, and the certification is invalid. If such failures are
orrected, the certification process can be restarted, with no use of previous
testing results. Such corrections may lead to additional failures, or they may
not. So certifying the correctness of software is an empirical process that is
bound to succeed if the software is indeed correct and may succeed for some
time if the software is incorrect.

2.1

Cleanroom Statistical Quality Control

Cleanroom software engineering achieves statistical quality control over
software development by strictly separating the design process from the
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testing process in a pipeline of incremental software development. There are
three major engineering activities in this process (Linger and Mills, 1988;
Mills et al., 1987b):

Software Specification: First, structured architecture and precise specification of a pipeline of software increments that accumulate into the final
software product, which includes the statistics of its use as well as its function
and performance requirements.
Software Development: Second, box structured design and functional verification of each increment, delivery for testing and certification without
debugging beforehand, and subsequent correction of any failures that may
be uncovered during certification.
Software Certification: Third, statistical testing and certification of the
software reliability for the usage specification, notification to developers of
any failures discovered during certification, and subsequent recertification
as failures are corrected.

These three activities are defined and discussed in later sections.
As noted, there is an explicit feedback process between certification and
development on any failures found in statistical usage testing. This feedback
process provides an objective measure of the reliability of the software as it
matures in the development pipeline. It does, indeed, provide a statistical
quality control process for software development that has not been available
in this first human generation of trial-and-error programming.
Humans are fallible, even in using sound mathematical processes in functional verification, so software failures are possible and almost certain during
the certification process. But there is a surprising power and synergism
between functional verification and statistical usage testing (Dyer, 1992b).
First, as already noted, functional verification can be scaled up for high
productivity and still leave no more errors than heuristic programming often
leaves after unit and system testing combined. Second, it turns out that the
mathematical errors left are much easier to find and fix during testing than
errors left behind in debugging, by a factor of five as measured in practice
(Mills et al., 1987b) . Mathematical errors usually turn out to be simple
blunders in the software, whereas errors left behind or introduced in debugging are usually deeper in logic or wider in system scope than those fixed.
As a result, statistical usage testing not only provides a formal, objective
basis for the certification of reliability under use, but also uncovers the errors
of mathematical fallibility with remarkable efficiency.
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Zero Defect Software Is Really Possible

In spite of the experiences of this first human generation in software
development, zero defect software is really possible. However, there is no
fo olproof logical way to know that software is zero defect. The proof is in
using the product without ever finding any failures. Mathematics is very
helpful in creating software that executes with no defects, but it is insufficient
by itself to guarantee it. Statistics is also very helpful in creating software
that executes zero defect, but is also insufficient by itself. Even so, mathematics and statistics foundations combined are very powerful bases for software
engineering with zero defects. Three illustrations of zero defect software are
noted next.
First, the U.S. 1980 Census was acquired by a nationwide network system
of 20 miniprocessors. The system was controlled by a 25 KLOC program,
hich operated its entire 10 months in field use with no failure observed. It
was developed by Mr. Paul Friday, of the U.S. Census Bureau, using stepwise refinement and functional verification in Pascal. Mr. Friday used formal
university courses in software engineering to achieve this feat. He was given
the highest technical award of the U .S. Department of Commerce for that
achievement.
Second, the IBM wheelwriter typewriter products released in 1984 are
controlled by three microprocessors with a 65 KLOC program. It has had
millions of users since, with no failures ever detected. The IBM team creating
rhis software also used functional verification and extensive testing in a wellmanaged software engineering environment to achieve this result. The team
had completed pass/ fail courses in formal software engineering before entering this project.
Third, the NASA space shuttle software of some 500 KLOC, while not
completely zero defect, has been zero defect in all flights. The first space
shuttle flight initialization failed because of five computers, three initialized
on one time frame, the other two on another time frame. That fault was
fixed and did not reappear. The IBM team also used functional stepwise
refinement and verification and extensive testing to achieve this result. The
pace shuttle software is such a large, complex, and visible product that
there are real lessons in it. All managers and programmers were required to
complete a basic curriculum of six pass/ fail courses in understanding programs as rules for mathematical functions, and functional verification of
programs and modules (Linger et al., 1979). The team received the highest
N ASA award for this achievement.
Looking ahead, Hevner and Becker (1992) introduce an integrated development environment based on repository data models that support Cleanroom specification, verification, and certification, as well as incremental
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development. Appropriate data models help identify tool requirements for
this environment.

3. Statistical Quality Control in Software Engineering
The fundamental concepts of SQC in software versus other fields are
significantly different. First, SQC in manufacturing or services assumes a
correct design and deals with efforts to realize such a design. In this case the
statistics deals with departures of the product from the design. But software
is design whose manufacture is practically perfect in program compiling,
linkage editing, etc. The design itself is under question and the statistics deals
with departures of the design from the specifications that are discovered
during testing and use.
Second, software development is a creative human activity only a human
generation old, largely carried out today by heuristic, trial-and-error methods. In this first human generation, testing during development has been
primarily coverage and ad hoc, with no scientific basis, rather than based
on statistical usage that can provide certified correctness. The objective
generation of testing on the basis of statistical usage specifications, and the
certification of software correctness from such objective statistical testing
leads to new human understandings of software development as a rigorous
and repeatable engineering process.
Third, we need to work more on certification of correctness by statistical
quality control because the other two areas of specification and development
are better thought out with many fundamental problems well addressed.
Certification of software is in its infancy, so there is much to learn, which
will result in many substantial improvements over the present state of
software testing. The technological goals are to create an entirely new human
capability for developing zero defect software using methods of SQC.
Many people presently believe that software has nothing to do with SQC
because software is deterministic, not statistical, with results that are either
right or wrong. In these people's view software is bound to have periodic
failures, and good software just exhibits fewer failures than poor software.
The innovation is to make usage statistics into the foundation for SQC as
applied to an imperfect design process rather than to a manufacturing process where the design is considered perfect. The elements of the Cleanroom
Engineering process have been shown to be very practical and successful in
creating software with zero defects and increased productivity.
In this connection, Dyer ( 1992b) describes the merger of functional
correctness verification in cleanroom engineering with formal inspections
often used today. The systematic, stepwise process of functional verification
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provides a framework for effective team inspections of software designs.
Procedures for conducting inspection-based verification are given in Dyer
1992b).

3.1

Statistical Test Design

In order to certify the correctness of software, it is necessary to define
statistical testing that yields meaningful results. Measurements are needed
to serve as a basis for the estimation of how well the software as designed
and implemented will satisfy its requirements in actual use. In the past few
years we have made significant progress in recognizing what measurements
need to be made and in developing a program for making and utilizing the
measurements.
This testing program must recognize both the statistics of use and the
importance of this use. First, failures in execution may be of many degrees
of seriousness. Some failures may produce correct data in incorrect formats,
but otherwise not affect continued execution. Other failures may produce
incorrect data but continue execution correctly. Still other failures may continue execution incorrectly, possibly losing data. The most serious of failures
may terminate execution unintentionally andj or lose data. The more serious
the failure, the more important it is to find it. For this reason, the criticalness
as well as the probabilities of failures must be considered. Some conditions
are so critical that they should be tested for sure, with probability 1. At first
glance this may not appear to be statistical testing, but it is at the endpoint
of a statistical domain.
The usage statistics of a software system or product is a new idea for
testing. Usage statistics is often used informally to evaluate designs against
performance requirements. For example, relative efficiency required -for
different responses, say for entering and accessing data, will help define data
tructures and algorithms required. If accessing data is much more frequent
than entering it, perhaps the data should be stored alphabetically and
accessed by binary search, while if entering is more frequent than accessing,
perhaps the data should be stored in sequence of entry and accessed by
linear search.
But usage statistics can be used to make testing more realistic. Wellintentioned testing by ad hoc invention can miss critical areas, for example
incorrect entries that are expected occasionally and require recovery operations. Testing by simple uniform probability can be entirely unrealistic if
usage statistics is far from uniform. For example, a programming language
compiler accepts a remarkably small fraction of all text sequences. So the
usage statistics of programs or near programs is important for realistic testing of compiler software. Any one user may not use exactly the usage statis-
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tics defined for testing, but a class of users can be used to define a realistic
usage statistics expected for them as a class. So the definition of realistic
usage statistics is a substantial job that goes beyond functional and performance specifications into the likely usage of the software.

3.2

Markov Chain Techniques for Software Certification

Markov chains have exceptional value in software testing (Whittaker,
1992; Whittaker and Poore, 1992). First, there is a question of how to use
a specification as a guide in constructing a Markov chain to model the usage
of correct software. Second, the testing process itself is modeled by another
Markov chain which includes any possible failures in execution. If the
software is correct, these two chains are identical. But if incorrect, the chains
are slightly different. While testing proceeds, the reliability and mean time
between failures in the second Markov chain can be estimated, both to
measure progress and to evaluate the reality for reaching zero defect
operations.
As already noted, the certification team must account for both the statistical concerns in testing and the relative importance of various inputs and
operations to users. A specific input under a specific condition may happen
rarely, but it can be important and therefore critical for testing. As a result,
a test design involves a hierarchical structure of tests, each requiring a specification Markov chain, ranging all the way from the entire system to a
single important operation. Just as with the software design, this test design
requires long-term, systematic research into usage statistics and usage
importance.
While unlikely, if all inputs under all conditions are equally important, a
single usage, statistics defined- set of tests is sufficient. But more likely, some
inputs under some conditions will be more important than others. Today,
much of testing is identified with specific cases of known importance,
independent of their statistics. These specific cases can be brought into the
statistics test designs as special cases. If an important test is defined with
probability 1, it is now part of the hierarchical structure that defines the
entire test. Usually, inputs and conditions will be partitioned naturally into
subsets of the entire input space. Such subsets will themselves be partitioned
into smaller subsets, and so on, clear down to single inputs and conditions.
The test analyses will involve successive inputs for which the Markov
process provides a good model. It not only matters at what frequencies
various inputs and conditions will arise, but also how these frequencies
depend on previous inputs (and thereby outputs) with input-to-input
frequencies, as well. This requirement for estimating usage frequencies is
new, and brings a new level of design to the testing process. Because of the
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test design work, the certification team must begin its analysis and design in
parallel with the development team.

4. Software Testing in This First H uman Generation
4.1

Unit Testing as a Private Activity

In this first generation of software development and maintenance, the
primary methods of software specification and design have been heuristic,
going from informal and imprecise natural language to formal programming
language by trial and error. When programs don't do the right things, was
it the specification or the design at fault? If the specification was informal,
how can one tell? The specifier may have had the right idea, but never written
it down completely. Or the programmer may have met all requirements that
were written down and extrapolated differently than the specifier intended.
As already noted, private unit testing and fixing is used without question.
What other way makes any sense? It seems so simple and so natural just to
get the small errors out. How could that be harmful? It hasn't been suspected
that so many new failures are introduced by unit testing and fixing. Unit
testing is regarded as a private activity for getting defects out of the small
parts of programs before assembling and integrating them into larger parts.
Subsequently, more defects are discovered in the larger parts as smaller parts
are tied together. The original programmers are often gone by this time.
Finally, entire systems are frequently (almost always) delivered with more
defects yet to be found. Users frequently find many more defects than the
developers believed remained. As a result, many organizations have learned
to expose new software products to a select few users for initial shakedown
before distributing the products widely.
This first generation of heuristic methods and experiences seem to work;
after all, products are built. Advanced software teams do better than others
in using the best technical and managerial methods that can be found. And
_-et, even the advanced software teams stub their toes now and then. In fact,
more systems and products than casual observers might imagine are seriously
delayed or even abandoned with all the programs written, because they are
too error-prone to release. Hundreds of person years may be involved, but
the software still cannot be made to work correctly. In more recent times,
several major PC upgraded products for word processing and financial
analysis have been released more than a year behind their announcements
at a major cost to their producing companies.
The strange thing about most such software disasters is that they were
not looked on as dangerous undertakings in their beginnings. Of course,
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any software effort is a bit risky because computer code is so detailed and
programmers are a little unpredictable. But "nobody said it would be so hard
at the outset," is a typical comment. New and better heuristics, especially
supported by CASE tools, are becoming available in object-oriented
methods. With object-oriented methods, better approaches to high-level
designs and specifications seem possible. But the software rubber meets
the hardware road with the program code, and unit debugging is seldom
questioned. At that stage, larger parts and entire products are tested, often
with good records kept on the coverage testing, to ensure that every branch
is exercised both ways and that all code is tested at least once. Yet in spite
of the testing coverage, users often find unexpected levels of failures in
operations, making the product marginal or unacceptable.
The barely recognized fact is that unit debugging is the most error-prone
activity in software development today. Fixing any failure found is usually
successful. But creating a new and deeper failure occurs 15% of the time or
more. This occurs because debugging strives to ensure correct outputs, which
leads to developers modifying code to produce a correct output, and not
modifying the code to produce the correct function . As a result, large failurefilled software systems may never be debugged sufficiently to be released,
even though extensive efforts are made.

4.2

A Historical Lesson in Typewriting

These experiences are not surprising in this first human generation of
software development. They just seem part of the problem facing people in
the field. Or are they? A hundred years ago people faced another set of
problems in using the new typewriters, whose practical invention occurred
late in the 19th century. How to type text and tabular material without
errors at reasonable rates? Typewriters were special machines for special
purposes. Executives, even the president of the United States, hand wrote
their own letters by and large, and assistants or secretaries did likewise.
Typewriters were used to write reports and documents with relatively poor
quality reprints compared with printing. They certainly did not replace
assembling print for printing machines. Typewriting was error-prone. One
had to look at the keys, of course, while typing, so a reasonable way was to
memorize the text a sentence at a time. But in going back and forth between
the text and the typewriter, small mistakes or lapses were very possible from
time to time. Correcting a character, even a word, might not be so bad.
Correcting a missed sentence early on a typed page was better fixed by
starting the page over.
With this background for almost a human generation of using typewriters,
the new idea of touch typing, typing without looking at the keys, was a
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very strange one. "That's silly. Who could possibly do that?" In teaching
typewriting, people who look at the keys can get useful work done in the
very first day. In fact they learn practically all there is to know about a
typewriter in the very first day, and just need to get more practice and skill
by typewriting. In teaching touch typing, people get no useful work done in
rbe first day or the first week. "Why would anyone spend time in such a
useless activity?" Of course, we know that touch typing turned out to be an
internationally useful method that put typewriters into business offices on a
mass basis. Typewriter makers improved their products in many ways, but
the reason typewriters were eventually made in such quantities was due to
people knowing how to use them well rather than to companies knowing
bow to make them well.
There is a lesson in touch typing for software development. In software,
teaching a programming language and how to compile and execute programs
allows people to write programs right away. Very likely, such programs will
require considerable debugging, and many text books say just that. With
more and more experience in programming alone or in teams, errors and
unit debugging are just an accepted and integral part of programming.
But people with the right education and training do not need to unit debug
their software any more than people need to look at the keys when they
cype. Yet, just as in teaching touch typing, much less trial and error programming is done at the beginning in good software education, with much greater
emphasis on formal methods in program specification, design, and verification. When serious programming begins only after formal methods, very
little debugging will be required, because of more explicit design and verification from good specifications. But "why not let the computers find the
errors, why make so much of a simple program?" For simple programs,
that may be a perfectly good question. But as programs get larger and more
complex, computers don't find the errors, and much more time will be spent
debugging than writing the code originally.

4.3

Two Sacred Cows in Software

Software engineering and computer science are relatively new subjects,
only a human generation old. In this first generation, two major sacred cows
have emerged from the heuristic, error-prone software development of this
entirely new human activity-namely program debugging and coverage testing. As noted previously, program debugging before independent usage testing is unnecessary and creates deeper errors in software than are generally
ound and fixed. It is also a surprise to discover that coverage testing is a
yery inefficient way of getting reliable software and provides no capability
fo r scientific certification of reliability.
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As a first generation effort, it has only seemed natural to debug programs
as they are written, and even to establish technical and managerial standards
for such debugging. For example, in the first generation in typing, it only
seemed natural to look at the keys. Touch typing without looking at the
keys must have looked very strange to the first generation of hunt and peck
typists. Similarly, software development without debugging before independent, certification testing of user function looks very strange to the first
generation of trial and error programmers. It is quite usual for human
performance to be surprising in new areas, and software development will
prove to be no exception.
Just as debugging programs has seemed natural, coverage testing has also
seemed to be a natural and powerful process. Although 100% coverage
testing is known to still leave errors behind, coverage testing seems to provide
a systematic process for developing tests and recording results in wellmanaged development. So it comes as a major surprise to discover that
statistical usage testing is more than an order of magnitude more effective
than coverage testing in increasing the time between failures in use. Coverage
testing may, indeed, discover more errors in error-prone software than usage
testing, but it discovers errors of all failure rates, while usage testing discovers
the high failure rate errors more critical to users.

4.4

The Power of Usage Testing over Coverage Testing

The writings and data of Adams ( 1980) in the analysis of software testing,
and the differences between software errors and failures, give entirely new
insights in software testing. Since Adams has discovered an amazingly wide
spectrum in failure rates for software errors, it is no longer sensible to treat
errors as homogeneous objects to find and fix. Finding and fixing errors with
high failure rates produces much more reliable software than finding and
fixing just any errors, which may have average or low failure rates.
The major surprise in Adams' data is the relative power of finding and
fixing errors in usage testing over coverage testing, a factor of 30 in increasing
mean time to failure (MTTF). That factor of 30 seems incredible until the
facts are worked out from Adams' data. But it explains many anecdotes
about experiences in testing. In one such experience, an operating systems
development group used coverage testing systematically in a major revision
and for weeks measured mean time to crashes in seconds. It reluctantly
allowed user tapes in one weekend, but on fixing those errors, found that
the mean time to abends jumped literally from seconds to minutes.
The Adams data is given in Table I (from Adams, 1980). It describes
distributions of failure rates for errors in nine major IBM products, including
the major operating systems, language compilers, and database systems.
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TABLE
DISTRIBUTIONS O F ERRORS (IN

%) AMONG MEAN TIME TO FAILURE (MTTF) CLASSES
MTTF

Product
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

I

in K months

60

19

6

1.9

0.6

0.19

0.06

0.019

34.2
34.2
33.7
34.2
34.2
32.0
34.0
31.9
31.2

28.8
28.0
28.5
28.5
28.5
28 .2
28.5
27.1
27.6

17.8
18.2
18.0
18.7
18.4
20.1
18.5
18.4
20.4

10.3
9.7
8.7
11.9
9.4
11 .5
9.9
11.1
12.8

5.0
4.5
6.5
4.4
4.4
5.0
4.5
6.5
5.6

2.1
3.2
2.8
2.0
2.9
2.1
2.7
2.7
1.9

1.2
1. 5
1.4
0.3
1.4
0.8
1.4
1.4
0.5

0.7
0.7
0.4
0.1
0.7
0.3
0.6
1.1
0.0

The uniformity of the failure rate distributions among these very different
products is truly amazing. But even more amazing is a spread in failure rates
over four orders of magnitude, from 19 months to 5,000 years (60K months)
calendar time in MTTF, with about 33% of the errors having an MTTF of
-,000 years, and 1% having an MTTF of 19 months.
With such a range in failure rates, it is easy to see that coverage testing
will find the very low failure rate errors a third of the time with practically
no effect on the MTTF by the fix, whereas usage testing will find many more
of the high failure rate errors with much greater effect. Table II develops the
data, using Table I, that shows the relative effectiveness of fixes in usage
esting and coverage testing, in terms of increased MTTF. Table II develops
the change in failure rates for each MTTF class of Table I, because it is the
failure rates of the MTTF classes that add up to the failure rate of the
product.
Line 1, Table II, denoted M (MTTF), is repeated directly from Table I,
namely the mean time between failures of the MTTF class. Line 2, denoted
ED (Error Density), is the average of the error densities of the nine products
of Table I, column by column, which represents a typical software product.
TABLE

II

ERROR DEN SIT IES AND FAILURE DENSITIES IN THE MTTF CLASSES OF TABLE

I

?roperty
M
ED
ED / M
FD
FD / M

60
33 .2
0.6
0.8
0

19
28.2
1. 5
2.0
0

6
18.7
3.1
3.9

1.9
10.6
5.6
7.3
4

0.6
5.2
8.7
11.1
18

0.19
2.5
13.2
17.1
90

0.06
1.1
18.3
23 .6
393

0.0 19
0.5
26.3
34.2
1,800
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Line 3, denoted ED /M, is the contribution of each class, on average, in
reducing the failure rate by fixing the next error found by coverage testing
(1/M is the failure rate of the class, ED is the probability that a member of
this class will be found next in coverage testing, so their product, ED j M, is
the expected reduction in the total failure rate from that class). Now ED / M
is also proportional to the usage failure rate in each class, since failures of
that rate will be distributed by just that amount. Therefore, line 3 is normalized to add to 100% in line 4, denoted FD (Failure Density) . It is interesting
to note that Error Density (ED) and Failure Density (FD) are almost reverse
distributions, Error Density being about a third at the high end of MTTFs
and Failure Density being about a third at the low end of MTTFs. Finally,
line 5, denoted FD /M, is the contribution of each class, on average, in
reducing the failure rate by fixing the next error found by usage testing.
The sums of the two lines ED / M and FD /M turn out to be proportional
to the decrease in failure rate from the respective fixes of errors found by
coverage testing and usage testing, respectively. Their sums are 77.3 and
2,306, with a ratio of about 30 between them. That is the basis for the
statement of their relative worth in increasing MTTF. It seems incredible at
first glance, but that is the number!
To see this in more detail, consider first the relative decreases in failure
rate R in the two cases :
Fix next error from coverage testing
R--+ R - (sum of ED/ M values)/( errors remaining)

= R - 77.3 / E .
Fix next error from usage testing
R--+ R - (sum of FD/ M values) / (errors remaining)
=

R - 2,306/ E.

Next, the increase in MTTF in each case will be
1/ (R - 77.3/E)- 1/ R

=

77.3/[R

* (E * R- 77.3)]

and
1/ (R- 2,306/ E) - 1/ R

=

2,306/ [R * (E * R- 2,306)] .

In these expressions, the numerator values 77.3 and 2,306 dominate, and the
denominators are nearly equal when E * R is much larger than 77.3 or 2,306
(either 77.3/ (E * R) or 2,306/ (E * R) is the fraction of R reduced by the
next fix and is supposed to be small in this analysis). As noted previously,
the ratio of these numerators is about 30 to 1, in favor of the fix with usage
testing.
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What Is Cleanroom Engineering of Software?
5.1

Cleanroom Engineering Process

The Cleanroom Engineering process develops software of certified correctness under statistical quality control in a pipeline of increments, with box
structured design and functional verification but no program debugging
permitted before independent statistical usage testing of the increments. It
provides rigorous methods for software specification, development, and certification that are capable of producing low or zero defect software of arbitrary size and complexity. Box structured design is based on a Parnas usage
hierarchy of modules. Such modules, also known as data abstractions or
objects, are described by a set of operations that may define and access
internally stored data. Functional verification is based on the fact that any
program or program part is a rule for a mathematical function. It may not
be the function desired, but it is a function.
The term Cleanroom is taken from the hardware industry to mean an
emphasis on preventing errors, rather than allowing errors to appear and
removing them later (of course any errors introduced should be removed).
Cleanroom Engineering of software involves rigorous methods that enable
greater control over both product and process. The Cleanroom process not
only produces software of high correctness and high performance, but does
o while yielding high productivity and meeting schedules. The intellectual
control provided by the rigorous Cleanroom process allows both technical
and management control.
Cleanroom Engineering achieves statistical quality control over software
development by strictly separating the design process from the testing process in a pipeline of incremental software development. There are three major
engineering activities in the process (Linger and Mills, 1988; Mills eta!.,
1987b):
Specification: First, a specification team creates an incremental specification that defines a pipeline of software increments that accumulate into the
final software product, which includes the statistics of its use as well as its
function and performance requirements.
Development: Second, a development team designs and codes increments
specified using box structured design and functional verification of each
increment, with delivery to certification with no debugging beforehand, and
provides subsequent correction for any failures that may be uncovered during certification.
Certification: Third, a certification team uses statistical testing and analysis for the certification of the software correctness to the usage specification,
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notification to designers of any failures discovered during certification, and
subsequent recertification as failures are corrected.
As noted, there is an explicit feedback process between certification and
development on any failures found in statistical usage testing. This feedback
process provides an objective measure of the correctness of the software as
it matures in the development pipeline. It does, indeed, provide a statistical
quality control process for software development that has not been available
in this first human generation of trial and error programming.

5.2

Cleanroom Engineering Methods

Cleanroom Engineering provides a set of rigorous methods for software
development under statistical quality control, based on sound mathematical
and statistical principles. While millions of people are involved in software,
most of them regard software development as an intuitive, heuristic activity.
They do not imagine software engineering as a mathematics-based subject
with complete rigor being possible. But software engineering should be and
can be a mathematics-based activity. When mathematical rigor is applied,
both quality and productivity increase. Nor can they imagine software engineering based on statistics since computers are completely deterministic in
behavior. And yet the usage of software is statistical in nature.
For software engineering, being mathematics-based does not mean being
numbers-based. Numbers are part of mathematics, but the finite basis of
computers adds complexity to dealing with numbers. With integers, computers face overflow possibilities that need to be assured against. With real
numbers, computers face roundoff problems, so arithmetic becomes approximate, not exact. In these cases, software must deal with computer operations,
not with ideal numerical operations. But mathematics deals with any
operations performed by computers, not simply approximate numerical
operations. Fortunately, the nonnumerical operations are typically exact in
computers, for example logic operations, even text processing operations, so
their mathematical basis is very solid. At first glance, nonnumerical
operations may not look mathematical, but they are. Logic, set theory, and
function theory are clearly nonnumerical mathematics, but sorting theory,
text processing theory, and graph theory can also be framed as mathematics
as well.
Software is a human generation old, while mathematics is many human
generations old. Although not understood early or widely, software has
direct mathematical foundations because of the very deterministic behavior
of computers. A computer program is a rule for a mathematical function,
mapping all possible initial states into final states. Such functions are very
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omplex compared with functions in physical science and engineering, and
traditional mathematical notation is very insufficient. But sufficient mathematical notation is emerging in computer science and software engineering
for dealing with the syntax and semantics of programs and their functions.
As an example of deep and useful mathematics, place notation and long
division moved arithmetic from error-prone operations on whole numbers
to rigorous methods a numerical place at a time a thousand years ago in the
Western world. As a result, school children today can out perform Archimedes and Euclid in arithmetic. Similar movement is possible in software
today. Place notation and long division look pretty simple today, but it has
taken hundreds of years to arrive at this simple form. For example, it took
the Italian business world several hundred years to move from Roman
numerals to arabic numbers in practice.
Statistics is another subject of longer professional development than
software. But only a hundred years ago, statistics was intuitive and heuristic,
even though rigorous arithmetic was used in creating sums and averages.
Yet in this time, statistics has become a rigorous, mathematics-based subject,
often finding counterintuitive results using statistics in specific topics. For
example, the agriculture industry of the Western world has been greatly
improved by the effective use of statistics in both plant selection and
treatment. The application of statistics now makes it possible for software
developers to predict with confidence the quality level of the software when
it is fully developed quite early in the development life cycle.
Cleanroom Engineering not only puts software development under statistical quality control, but takes out debugging from the list of developer
activities, instead using mathematical reasoning before independent testing
and certification. Just as typists looked at the keys when typewriters first
came out, programmers have felt the need to debug programs in this first
human generation of programming. But while counterintuitive at the time,
typists went to touch typing with both higher productivity and fewer errors.
In the same way, well-educated software engineers can create software with
no execution or debugging before it is tested by independent test and certification engineers with the product having higher productivity and much
greater quality than previously.

5.3

Dealing with Human Fallibility

Humans are fallible, even in using sound mathematical processes in
functional verification, so finding software failures is possible during the
certification process. But there is a surprising power and synergism between
functional verification and statistical usage testing (Mills et al. , 1987b). First,
as already noted, functional verification can be scaled up for high produc-
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tivity and still leave no more errors than heuristic programming often leaves
after unit and system testing combined. Second, it turns out that the
mathematical errors left are much easier to find and fix during testing than
errors left behind in debugging, measured at a factor of five in practice (Mills
et al., 1987b). Mathematical errors usually turn out to be simple oversights
in the software, whereas errors left behind or introduced in debugging are
usually deeper in logic or wider in system scope than those fixed. As a result,
statistical usage testing not only provides a formal, objective basis for the
certification of correctness under use, but also uncovers the errors of mathematical fallibility with remarkable efficiency.
In Cleanroom Engineering a major discovery is the ability of well-educated
and motivated people to create nearly defect-free software before any execution or debugging, with many fewer than five defects per thousand lines of
code. Such code is ready for usage testing and certification with no unit
debugging by the designers. In this first human generation of software
development it has been counterintuitive to expect software with so few
defects at the outset. Typical heuristic programming leaves 50 defects per
thousand lines of code, then reduces that number to five or fewer by debugging. The problem is that for programmers with good capabilities and
intentions, it seems on the surface that unit debugging makes complete
correctness on first coding unnecessary. But the unknown result is the
number of faults, over 15%, created in even the simple seeming fixes.
The mathematical foundations for Cleanroom Engineering come from the
deterministic nature of computers themselves. As noted, a computer program is no more and no less than a rule for a mathematical function (Linger
et al., 1979; Mills, 1975). Such a function need not be numerical, of course,
and most programs do not define numerical functions. But for every legal
input, a program directs the computer to produce a unique output, whether
correct as specified or not. And the set of all such input- output pairs is a
mathematical function. A more intuitive way to view a program in this first
generation is as a set of instructions for specific executions with specific input
data. While correct, this view misses a point of reusing well-known and
tested mathematical ideas, regarding computer programming as new and
private art rather than more mature and public engineering.
With these mathematical foundations, software development becomes a
process of constructing rules for functions that meet required specifications,
which need not be a trial and error programming process. The functional
semantics of a structured programming language can be expressed in an
algebra of functions with function operations corresponding to program
sequence, alternation, and iteration (Linger et al., 1979). The systematic top
down development of programs is mirrored in describing function rules in
terms of algebraic operations among simpler functions, and their rules in
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terms of still simpler functions until the rules of the programming language
are reached. It is a new mental base for most programmers to consider the
complete functions needed, top down, rather than computer executions for
specific data.
Trammel et al. (1992) discuss the practical realities in adopting the Cleanroom process in software organizations. They define a three-phase process
for introducing Cleanroom in a software development organization, including management commitment and team ownership as critical success factors.

5.4

Cleanroom Experiences

The IBM COBOL Structuring Facility (IBM COBOL/ SF), a complex
product of some 80K lines of PL/I source code, was developed in the Cleanroom discipline, with box-structured design and functional verification but
no debugging before usage testing and certification of its correctness. A
Yersion of the U.S. A.F. HH60 (helicopter) flight control program of over
0 KLOC was also developed using Cleanroom. The Coarse/ Fine Attitude
Determination Subsystems (CFADS) of the UARS Attitude Ground
Support System (AGSS) of some 30 KLOC has been developed with Clean-oom at NASA.
The IBM COBOL/ SF converts an unstructured COBOL program into a
5lructured one of identical function. It uses considerable artificial intelligence
:o transform a flat structured program into one with a deeper hierarchy that
- much easier to understand and modify. The product line was prototyped
i th Cleanroom discipline at the outset, then individual products were gener_ted in Cleanroom extensions. In this development, several challenging
- hedules were defined for competitive reasons, but every schedule was met.
The COBOL/ SF products have high function per line of code. The proto--pe was estimated at 100 KLOC by an experienced language processing
.: oup, but the Cleanroom developed prototype was 20 KLOC. The software
designed not only in structured programming, but also in structured
~ta access. No arrays or pointers were used in the design; instead, sets,
ueues, and stacks were used as primitive data structures (Mills and Linger,
986). Such data-structured programs are more reliably verified and
· pected, and also more readily optimized with respect to size or performance, as required.
COBOL/ SF, Version 2, consists of 80 KLOC, 28 KLOC reused from
revious products, 52 KLOC new or changed, designed and tested in a
ipeline of five increments (Linger and Mills, 1988), the largest over
9 KLOC. A total of 179 corrections were required during certification,
-ewer than 3.5 corrections per KLOC for new code with no developer execu·on, fewer than 2 corrections per KLOC for all code. The productivity of
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the development was 740 LOC per staff month, including all specification,
design, implementation, and management, in meeting a very short deadline.
The HH60 flight control program was developed on schedule. Programmers' morale went from quite low at the outset (" why us? " ) to very high on
discovering their unexpected capability in accurate software design without
debugging. The 12 programmers involved had all passed the pass/ fail coursework in mathematical (functional) verification of the IBM Software
Engineering Institute, but were provided a week's review as a team for the
project. The testers had much more to learn about certification by objective
statistics (Currit et al., 1986).
The subsystem Coarse/ Fine Attitude Determination System (CFADS) of
the NASA Attitude Ground Support System (AGSS) of some 30 KLOC
was developed in Fortran. Sixty-two percent of the subroutines, which averaged 258 source lines each, compiled correctly the first time, with but one
of the rest compiled correctly on the second attempt. Compared with wellmeasured related systems, the failure rate was down by a factor of five while
the productivity was up by 70% (Kouchakdjian et al. , 1989).
V. R. Basili and F. T . Baker introduced Cleanroom ideas in an undergraduate software engineering course at the University of Maryland, assisted
by R. W. Selby. As a result, a controlled experiment in a small software
project was carried out over two academic years, using 15 teams with both
traditional and Cleanroom methods. The result, even on first exposure to
Cleanroom, was positive in the production of reliable software, compared
with traditional results (Selby et al., 1987).
Cleanroom projects have been carried out at the University of Tennessee,
under the leadership of J. H. Poore (Mills and Poore, 1988) and at the
University of Florida under H . D . Mills. At Florida, seven teams of undergraduates produced uniformly successful systems for a common structured
specification of three increments. It is a surprise for undergraduates to
consider software development as a serious engineering activity using
mathematical verification instead of debugging, since software development
is typically introduced primarily as a trial-and-error activity with no real
technical standards.

6.

Box Structured Software System Design

Box structured design is based on a Parnas usage hierarchy of modules
(Parnas, 1972, 1979). Such modules, also known as data abstractions or
objects, are described by a set of operations that may define and access
internally stored data. In Ada, such modules are defined as packages, with
operations defined by the calls of the procedures and functions of the packages, and internal data declared in the package.
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Stacks, queues, and sequential or random access files provide simple
=xamples of such modules or packages. Part of their discipline is that interilillly stored data cannot be accessed or altered in any way except through
-· e explicit operations of the package. It is critical in box structured design
·o recognize that packages exist at every level from complete systems to
dividual program variables. It is also critical to recognize that a verifiable
;:esign must deal with a usage hierarchy rather than a parts hierarchy in its
srructure. A program that stores no data between invocations can be
.:escribed in terms of a parts hierarchy of its smaller and smaller parts,
xcause any use depends only on data supplied to it on its call with no
~~pendence on previous calls. But each call to a specific realization of a
_ ckage, say a queue, will depend not only on the present call and data
_ pplied to it, but also on previous calls and data supplied then.
The parts hierarchy of a structured program identifies every sequence,
ternation, and iteration (say every begin-end, if-then-else, while-loop) at
=':ery level. It turns out that the usage hierarchy of a system of packages
say an object-oriented design with all objects identified) also identifies every
::all (use) of every operation of every package. The semantics of the struc!lred program are defined by a mathematical function for each sequence,
· ternation, and iteration in the parts hierarchy. That doesn't quite work for
·· e operations of packages because of usage history dependencies. But there
- a simple extension for packages that does work. It is to model the behavior
f a package as a state machine, with its calls of its several operations as
puts to the common state machine. Then the semantics of such a package
-defined by the transition function of its state machine (with an initial state).
llen the operations are defined by structured programs, the semantics of
• ckages becomes a simple extension of the semantics of structured
_Tograms.
Deck et al. ( 1992) introduce a taxonomy of black box semantics based on
teractive properties of the system to be specified. They define three classes
-semantics to specify systems of increasing complexity in their interactions
"th other systems in the execution environment. The semantics extend to
teractive and concurrent system specifications.

6.1

The Basis for Box Structured Design

While theoretically straightforward, the practical design of systems of
1>arnas modules (object-oriented systems) in usage hierarchies can seem quite
w mplex on first exposure. It seems much simpler to outline such designs in
?<Uis hierarchies and structures, for example in data flow diagrams, without
_;· tinguishing between separate usages of the same module. While that may
.seem simpler at the moment, such design outlines are incomplete and often
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lead to faulty completions at the detailed programming levels. In spite of
their common use in this first human generation of system design, data flow
diagrams should only be used within rigorous design methods rather than
leaving critical requirements to details with incomplete specifications.
In order to create and control such designs based on usage hierarchies in
more practical ways, their box structures provide standard, finer grained
subdescriptions for any package of three forms, namely as black boxes, as
state boxes, and as clear boxes, defined as follows (Mills, 1988; Mills et al.,
1986, 1987).
Black Box: External view of a Parnas package, describing its behavior as
a mathematical function from historical sequences of stimuli to its next
response.
State Box: Intermediate view of a Parnas package, describing its behavior
by use of an internal state and internal black box with a mathematical
function from historical sequences of stimuli and states to its next response
and state, and an initial internal state.
Clear Box: Internal view of a Parnas package, describing the internal
black box of its state box in a usage control structure of other Parnas
packages; such a control structure may define sequential or concurrent use
of the other packages.

Box structures enforce completeness and precision in design of software
systems as usage hierarchies of Parnas packages. Such completeness and
precision lead to pleasant surprises in human capabilities in software engineering and development. The surprises are in capabilities to move from
system specifications to design in programs without the need for unit/
package testing and debugging before delivery to system usage testing. In
this first generation of software development, it has been widely assumed
that trial-and-error programming, unit testing, and debugging were necessary. But well-educated, well-motivated software professionals are indeed
capable of developing software systems of arbitrary size and complexity
without program debugging before system usage testing (Anderson and
Goodman, 1957).
Fetzer and Poore (1992) introduce techniques for using the Z notation in
defining box structures using the set theoretic and predicate calculus constructs defined in Z. Z provides a rigorous, formal language for the inner
syntax of black box and state box forms. They introduce the integration of
box structures and Z notation in a miniature specification.
In Rosen et al. (1992), Rosen introduces general design language selection
criteria based on the design and verification requirements of cleanroom

ZERO DEFECT SOFTWARE

27

software development. Syntactic and semantic language requirements are
described for disciplined control and data structures, for well-defined
intended functions, and for function theoretic proof rules for verification as
described. In the definition of the Design C language, a specialization of Z
is given in terms of these requirements.
Fuhrer et al. ( 1990) describe some cleanroom tools, including the Development Assistant, Certification Assistant, and Management Assistant CASE
tools for supporting cleanroom operations. A summary is given of the
cleanroom development of these tools themselves through seven code increments, including metrics from design, verification, and statistical quality
certification.

6.2

Stepwise Refinemen t and Verification of Software

Once the design is complete, the clear box at each level is expanded to
code to implement fully the defined function rule for the black box function
at that level by stepwise refinement, as introduced by Wirth (1971). Following each expansion, functional verification is used to help structure a proof
that the expansion correctly implements the specification. The nature of the
proof revolves around the fact that a program is a rule for a function and
the specification for the program is a relation or function. What must be
hown in the proof is that the rule (the program) correctly implements the
relation or function (the specification) for the full range of the specification
and no more. Linger, Mills and Witt (1979) have developed a correctness
theorem that defines what must be shown to prove that a program is equivalent to its specification for each of the structured programming language
constructs. The proof strategy is subdivided into small parts which easily
accumulate into a proof for a large program. Experience indicates that
people are able to master these ideas and construct proof arguments for very
large software systems.
The development team expands each clear box in the usage hierarchy into
the selected target code using stepwise refinement and functional verification.
As the development team designs and implements the software, it is held
collectively responsible for the quality of the software.
In describing the activities of software development, no mention is made
of testing or even of compilation. The cleanroom development team does
not test or even compile. They use mathematical proofs (functional verification) to demonstrate the correctness of programming units. Testing and
measuring failures by program execution is the responsibility of the
certification team.
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6.3

The Mathematical Basis for Functional Verification

As noted, any program or program part is a rule for a mathematical
function. It may not be the function desired, but it is a function. In structured
programs, the rules are direct in form, building program rules out of just
two function building operations: first, function composition, which
corresponds to sequential execution of program parts, and second, disjoint
function union, which corresponds to alternative execution of one program
part or another, as in if/or case structures. Program iteration uses no more
than these two operations together, and function recursion provides a useful
view of an iteration process.
Any program part or total program defines a single, possibly complex
function. The function is seldom a numerical function in classical terms.
Even numerical programs must deal with finite sets of numbers in which
overflow and roundoff's depart from classical number systems. Given the
text or name of a program or program part in whatever language, say a
program called Alpha in Ada defined by a set of external packages Gamma
and an internal procedure called Beta
Alpha = with Gamma;
procedure Beta
IS

begin
end Beta;
the program function will be denoted by brackets [ ] around the name or
text, such as
[Alpha] = [with Gamma;
procedure Beta
is
begin
end Beta;]
In this case [Alpha] is a set of ordered pairs
[Alpha] = {(X, Y) I Given initial state X,
state Y}

Alph~

will produce final

If Alpha loops indefinitely, or does not terminate for some other reason, for
some entry state, that state is not part of [Alpha]. The function [Alpha] is

•••

a;:.
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determined by Ada text, but is independent of the language Ada. In this
case, Alpha is a rule for the function [Alpha], but there are many rules for
a single function. The same function can be defined by a rule in Fortran
text, COBOL text, etc., even machine code.

6.4

Functional Verification of Program Parts

From programs to program parts, starting with simple assignment statements, such as
x:=y;

in Ada, the program part function

[x := y;]

takes its initial data state to its final data state. If legal, it will change the
value of x in the final state to the value of y in the initial state and change
no other values of variables in the initial state. If illegal, the final state
may be quite different from the initial state, possibly with both x and y
disappearing, as well as other variables, in terminating the entire program
execution. So assignment statements have simple function parts when legal,
but possibly more complex function parts when illegal. In summary, the
function [x := y] is a set of ordered pairs with second members determined
uniquely by the first members
[x

:=

y;] = { «x, y, ... ), <y, y, ... »I x := y; is legal}
u { «x, y, ... ), <???))I x := y; is illegal}

where ??? will be determined by other aspects of the initial state. Illegal
situations will be suppressed in what follows for the sake of time. In more
direct function notation, dealing only with the legal situation,
[x := y;]( <x, y , ...

>) =

(y , y, ...

>
>

in which the function argument <x, y , ... produces the function value
(y,y, .. . ).
Next, for a sequence of statements, such as
x := y; y := z; z := x;

in Ada, the part function

[x := y; y

:= z; z :=

x;]
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will alter values of x, y, and z as a composition of the three individual
assignment functions
[x := y;]

* [y := z;] * [z := x;] .

That is, beginning with an initial state as argument, the first assignment
function gives a new state as value

[x := y ;]( (x, y, z, . .. ) )

= (y, y, z, ... )

the second assignment function uses this value as an argument
[y := z ;]( (y, y, z, 0 00)) = (y, z, z, 0. 0)

and the third assignment function uses this last value as argument

[z := x;]( (y, z, z, ... )) = (y, z, y, ... )
That is, the composition function is a nested set of simpler functions that
evaluate as

([x := y;]

* [y := z;] * [z := x;])( (x, y, z, ... ))

=

[z := x ;]([y := z ;]([x := y;]( (x, y, z, ... ) )))

=

[z := x; ]([y := z;]( (y, y, z, . .. ) ))

=

[z := x ;]( (y, z, z, ... ) )

= (y, z,y, ... )
as worked out just before. In summary, this composition function will interchange the values of y and z and leave x with the initial value of y, not
changing any other data in the initial state.
Finally, for an alternation statement, such as
if x > y then y := z; else x := z end if;
in Ada, the part function will execute either the then part or the else part,
so that
[if x > y then y := z; else x := z; end if;]
=

(x > y-> [y

:=

z; ] Ix

=

y-> [x := z;])

= [y:=z;lx> y] u [x:=z; lx=y]
where the expression [y := z; I x > y] means the function [y := z;] with its
domain restricted to the condition x > y. That is, the part function is a union
of disjoint functions.
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Statistical Quality Control

Software is either correct or incorrect in design to a specification, in contrast to hardware which is reliable to a certain level in performing to a
correct design. For small and regular software, it may be possible to test
exhaustively the software to determine its correctness. But software of any
size or complexity can only be tested partially, and typically a very small
fraction of possible inputs are actually tested. Certifying the correctness of
such software requires two conditions, namely
1. statistical testing with inputs characteristic of actual usage, and
2. no failures in the testing.
F or interactive software, the statistical correlation of successive inputs must
be treated as well. If any failures arise in testing or subsequent usage, the
-oftware is incorrect, and the certification is invalid. If such failures are
orrected, the certification process can be restarted, with no use of previous
esting results. Such corrections may lead to additional failures, or may not.
So certifying the correctness of software is an empirical process that is bound
o succeed if the software is indeed correct and may succeed for some time
if the software is incorrect. While possibly frustrating at first glance, this is
all humans can assert about the correctness of software. But on second
glance, the sequential history of certification efforts provides a human basis
-or assessing the quality of the software and expectations for achieving future
~o rrectness.

The statistical foundations for cleanroom engineering come from adding
:ISage statistics to software specifications, along with function and perfor::nance requirements (Cobb and Mills, 1990; Mills et al., 1987b; Whittaker
:md Poore, 1992). Such usage statistics provide a basis for measuring the
correctness of the software during its development, and thereby measuring
- e accuracy of the design in meeting functional and performance requireents. A more usual way to view development in this first generation is as
~ difficult-to-predict art form. Software with no known errors at delivery
:"requently experiences many failures in actual usage.

7.1

Precision Specifications

In this first human generation of software development, most of the
rogress and discipline has been discovered in the latter parts of the life
: cle, first in coding machine programs in higher level languages, then in
::!.feaS such as structured programming and object-oriented design. Problems
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in requirements analyses and specifications are more difficult. Defining precisely what is needed and what should be provided by software is more
general and difficult than simply producing working software in hopes that
it will be satisfactory on trial by users. Even when specifications are required,
they are frequently provided in informal, natural languages with considerable room for misunderstandings between designers and users, and with gaps
in exact details in which programming misinterpretations are possible and
likely.
Precision specifications require formal languages, just as programming
does. In the case of programming the need is very obvious because computer
machine languages are formal. But as systems become more complex and
are used by more people with more critical impacts on business, industry,
and government institutions, the need for formal languages for specifications
becomes clearer. New programming languages have improved primarily in
their abilities to provide explicit structure in data and procedure. For
example, Ada has no more capability in defining machine operations than
Fortran or COBOL. But it has more explicit design structures for people to
use, for example in packages for data abstractions or objects. Specification
languages also need explicit structures for the same reason, to allow people
to express requirements as directly as possible.
Regardless of the language, formal or informal, a functional specification
defines not only legal system inputs, but legal input histories, and for each
legal input history, a set of one or more legal outputs. Such legal input
.histories may be defined in real time systems in which real time is a critical
factor, and the outputs given real time requirements as well. Illegal inputs
and histories may be treated in various ways, from ignoring them to attempts
to decipher or correct them. Any definite treatments of illegal inputs or
histories become part of the specification as well. The abstraction of any
such functional specification, in any language, is a mathematical relationa set of ordered pairs whose first members are input histories and whose
second members are outputs. Then, there is a very direct and simple mathematical definition for a program meeting a specification. It is that the function defined by the program determines a value for every argument in the
domain of the specification relation and that this value be associated with
that argument in the relation (Mills, 1986; Mills et al., 1987a).
In cleanroom software engineering, precision specifications are extended
in two separate ways to create a structured architecture. First, the functional
specifications are designed as a set of nested subspecifications, each a strict
subset of the preceding subspecification. Then, beginning with the smallest
subspecification, a pipeline of software increments is defined with each step
going to the next larger subspecification (Mills et al., 1987b ). Second, the
usage of the functional specifications is defined as a statistical distribution
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over all possible input histories (Dyer, 1992a ; Whittaker and Poore, 1990).
The structured architecture makes statistical quality control possible in subequent incremental software development to the functional specifications.
The usage statistics provide a statistical basis for testing and certification of
the reliability of the software in meeting its specifications.
The creation of a structured architecture defines not only what a software
ystem is to be when it is finished , but also a construction plan to design
and test the software in a pipeline of subsystems, step-by-step. The pipeline
must define step sizes that the design group can complete without debugging
prior to delivery to the certification group. Well-educated and disciplined
design groups may handle step sizes up to 20,000 lines of high level code.
But the structured architecture must also determine a satisfactory set of user
executable increments for the development pipeline of overlapping design
and test operations.
7.2

Statistical Certification

As each specified increment is completed by the designers, it is delivered
to the certifiers, combined with preceding increments, for testing based on
usage statistics. As noted, the cleanroom architecture must define a sequence
of nested increments that are to be executed exclusively by user commands
as they accumulate into the entire system required. Each subsequence represents a subsystem complete in itself, even though not all the user function
may be provided in it. For each subsystem, a certified reliability is defined
from the usage testing and failures discovered, if any.
The COBOL Structuring Facility consisted of80 KLOC, 28 KLOC reused
from previous products, 52 KLOC new or changed, designed and tested in
a pipeline of five increments (Kouchakdjian, 1989), the largest over
19 KLOC. A total of 179 corrections were required during certification,
under 3.5 corrections per KLOC for code with no previous execution. The
productivity of the development was 740 LOC per person/ month, including
all specification, design, implementation, and management, in meeting a very
short deadline.
Cleanroom statistical certification of software involves, first, the specification of usage statistics in addition to function and performance specifications. Such usage statistics provide a basis for assessing the correctness of
the software being tested under expected use. As each specified increment is
completed by the designers, it is delivered to the certifiers, who combine it
with preceding increments, for testing based on usage statistics. As noted,
the cleanroom architecture must define a sequence of nested increments that
are to be executed exclusively by user commands as they accumulate into the
entire system required. Each subsequence represents a subsystem complete in

34

HARLAN D. MILLS

itself, even though not all the user function may be provided in it. For each
subsystem, a certified correctness is defined from the usage testing and
failures discovered, if any.
It is characteristic that each increment goes through a maturation during
the testing, becoming more reliable, from corrections required for failures
found, serving thereby as a stable base as later increments are delivered and
integrated to the developing system. For example, the HH60 flight control
program had three increments (Cobb and Mills, 1990; Dyer, 1992a) of
over 10 KLOC each. Increment 1 code required 27 corrections for failures
discovered in its first appearance in increment 1 testing, but then only 1
correction during increment 1/ 2 testing, and 2 corrections during increment
1/ 2/ 3 testing. Code in increment 2 required 20 corrections during its first
appearance in increment 1/2 testing, and 5 corrections during increment
1/2/3 testing. Increment 3 code required 21 corrections on its first appearance in increment 1/ 2/ 3 testing. In this case, 76 corrections were required
in a system of over 30 KLOC, under 2.5 corrections per KLOC for verified
and inspected code, with no previous execution or debugging.
In the certification process, it is not only important to observe failures in
execution, but also the times between such failures in execution of usagerepresentative statistically generated inputs. Such test data must be developed to represent the sequential usage of the software by users, which, of
course, will account for previous outputs seen by the users and what needs
the users will have in various circumstances. The state of mind of a user and
the current need can be represented by a stochastic process determined by
a state machine whose present state is defined by previous inputs/ outputs
and a statistical model that provides the next input based on that present
state (Mills et al., 1987b).
7.3

Certification Tasks

In parallel with the cleanroom development team, the cleanroom certification team prepares to certify the software up to and including the increment being developed by the development team. The certification team uses
the usage profile and the portion of the specification that is applicable to the
increments to be verified to prepare test cases including proper outputs to
tests.
When the development team has completed an increment, the certification
team creates a version of the accumulated system up through this increment.
For each version the certification team compiles the increment, combines it
with previous increments, and certifies the accumulated system through this
version. If failures are encountered in the certification of a version, they are
returned to the development team for analysis and for engineering changes

ZERO DEFECT SOFTWARE

35

to whatever increments are causing the failures. While failures are likely to
be caused by the latest increment added, previous increments may be at fault
and changed as well, as noted in the HH60 experience. Each redelivery of
changed increments defines a new version of the accumulated system. If no
failures are encountered in the certification of a version, no additional
versions are required.
Within each version of the accumulating system, tests are constructed at
random in accordance with the specified usage statistics profile and then
exercised. Test results are compared with a standard and either a failure
occurred or the result was correct.

7.4

Certification on a Scientific Basis

Certification of software on a scientific basis requires a statistical usage
specification as well as functional and performance specifications. The testing
must be carried out by statistical selection of tests from these specifications.
Tests selected directly are ad hoc, and give no basis for statistical inference
on the correctness of the software. Some uses of the software may be much
more important than other uses, and the statistical selections can be given
in various levels of stratified sampling. Thus, not only basic statistical usage
is to be defined, but the relative importance of correctness for each usage.
This is new information that is often not known until the software is put
into actual use, but should be generated with functional and performance
specifications beforehand.
Next, the actual statistical testing must be carried out when the software
is available, possibly in stratified form. One extreme form of stratified form
is an important case chosen with probability 1 in that stratus. Next, if a
failure is found in testing, the software should be returned to the developers
for correction before further testing. When the correction is made, a new
start of testing is begun. The Time to Failure (TTF) is recorded for each
failure discovered. The Time without Failure (TWF) is tracked when no
failures have appeared. This TWF can be tracked after the software is
distributed to users as part of the characterization of its correctness. If
failures appear with users, the same rules of correction and restart of TWF
should occur.
As already noted, there is a profound difference between the correctness
of software and the reliability of hardware. When software has hundreds
or thousands of errors, its behaviour may seem to approximate hardware
reliability. But when software has under 0.1 failures per KLOC, possibly
none, the statistics of hardware failures are not valid. In this first human
generation, it has seemed impossible to create zero defect software, but it
can be, and has been, done, as will be discussed further. Part of the issue is
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discovering a new human possibility, with more engineering education and
engineering management. Part of the issue is the economic feasibility. It
requires less human effort to produce zero defect software with new methods
than error prone software with older methods. The human effort required
is both engineering verification and statistical testing, and they complement
each other in unexpected ways.

7.5

Usage Testing

A user's specification for a substantial software system will identify various
classes of user commands and data for various parts of the system. For
example, bringing up an interactive system at the beginning of the day will
require and accept certain kinds of user commands and data of which the
ordinary interactive users may not even be aware. But bringing the system
up is an integral part of the process for a certain class of users. During the
day, several distinct classes of users may be interacting simultaneously and
independently, such as users adding data to the system, or users making
enquiries, or users monitoring the system use and performance. Within each
such class, several or many users may be interacting simultaneously and
independently, as well.
However, as simultaneously and concurrently as these various users seem
to interact with the system, the individual computers in the system each
operate strictly sequentially in real time, shifting from one user to another
so rapidly that each user gets almost immediate response, even though ten,
or a thousand, other users may have been serviced between the user's stimulus and the system's response. As a rule, users are separated from one another
by operating in different, relatively. protected, data spaces that represent the
tasks they are doing. But users can interact, intentionally or not, as their
tasks become more intertwined.
For example, in an airline reservation system, a ticket agent may inquire
about availability of seats on a given flight and get the response that seats
are available. Then when the seats are requested a moment later, the response
is that no seats are available. Other users have interacted in picking up the
seats in the previous moment. Such system behavior is designed. It would
be conceivable to design an airline reservation system such that seats could
be held from inquiry to request, but it would require entirely different levels
of data storage and processing. In this way, it is clear that user independence
is relative, with economic and technical issues involved with multiple users
in systems.
This understanding that significant software systems have different kinds
of uses applies whether there are single or multiple users. A single user may
be using a system in different ways at different times, even within a single
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session. The design of the software will typically reflect such different uses
by packaging similar operations in common modules. For example, various
kinds of data searching may be handled in a search module, but data retrievals may be handled in a different retrieval module. It also makes similar
sense to identify similar stimuli response operations in specifications, entirely
from the user point of view and state of mind. In particular, complex specifications need to be designed as carefully as programs to reflect the natural
structure of the problem being solved and to find effective specification
structures that reflect user activities and understandings.

7.6

Software Usage as a Markov Process

As noted, software specifications deal with functional behavior and performance. Functional behavior is ordinarily decomposed into various
subfunctions in ways understandable by users, and often obtained from users
as requirements. Performance will usually affect design in fundamental ways.
But expected usage of the software will have critical impacts on performance
issues. For example, a data base system with much more querying than data
addition or deletion may call for a design with high performance queries at
the expense of data addition and deletion performance. Such a design can
be entirely unsatisfactory with different usage. Thus, expected usage statistics
can play a key role in software system design.
However, there is another critical use for usage statistics as part of
oftware specifications. It is to permit the certification of software. Software
behavior depends not only on how correct the software is but also on how
it is used. For every possible state of internally stored data, any command
and input data is handled either correctly or incorrectly, denoted as a failure
in the latter case at some level of seriousness.
Now, with a statistical usage specification for each possible internal state,
the probability of each selection of commands and input data in such a state
will be known. Next, the functional specification will define what the new
internal state will become, as well as the response to the user. These two
facts define a Markov process, namely the set of all internal data states and
the probability of getting from each member of the state set to the next
member. Of course, some members may be terminal when the process
terminates.
In a Ph.D. thesis by Whittaker (1992), a sound approach to certification
· given using the Markov processes to maintain the sequential integrity of
testing. The first Markov process, called the usage Markov chain, describes
usage of the software in terms of stimuli and state transitions. This chain is
used as a test sequence generator for the statistical test. Furthermore, a
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comprehensive analysis of the usage chain is developed that characterizes
the stochastic properties of the sequence used in the statistical test. The
second Markov process, called the testing Markov chain, describes the history of the statistical test including failure data. A method for constructing
the testing chain is given and an analysis is performed that results in a
discrete, data-driven software reliability model. Derived from this model are
estimates of the reliability, the mean time between failure, and an analytical
stopping criterion based on the stochastic properties of both Markov chains.

8.

Conclusions

Software is either correct or incorrect in design to a well-defined specification, in contrast to hardware which is reliable to a certain level in performing
to a design assumed to be correct. For small and regular software, it may
be possible to test exhaustively the software to determine its correctness.
Even then, failures can be overlooked from human fallibility. But software
of any size or complexity can only be tested partially, and typically a very
small fraction of possible inputs are actually tested. At first glance, the
fractions are so small for systems of ordinary size that the task of testing
looks impossible. But when combined with mathematical verification, getting
correct software is indeed possible.
Certifying the correctness of such software requires two conditions,
namely:
1. Statistical testing with inputs characteristic of actual usage, and
2. No failures in the testing.
For interactive software, the statistical correlation of successive inputs must
be treated as well. If any failures arise in testing or subsequent usage, the
software is incorrect, and the certification is invalid. If such failures are
corrected, the certification process can be restarted, with no use of previous
testing results. Such corrections may lead to additional failures, or may not.
So certifying the correctness of software is an empirical process that is bound
to succeed if the software is indeed correct and may succeed for some time
if the software is incorrect.
While possibly frustrating at first glance, this is all humans can assert
about the correctness of software. In both verification and testing, human
fallibility is present. But on second glance, the sequential history of certification efforts provides a human basis for assessing the quality of the software
and expectations for achieving future correctness.
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